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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
 
Keaton J Kell 
 
Master of Science 
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June 2017 
 
Title: Massacre on the Plains: A Better Way to Conceptualize Genocide on American 
Soil 
 
 This thesis examines the massacres of the Plains Indian Wars in the United States 
(1851-1890) and how they relate to contemporary theories of genocide. By using the 
Plains Indian Wars as a case study, a critique can be made of theories which inform 
predictive models and genocide policy. This thesis analyzes newspaper articles, histories, 
congressional investigations, presidential speeches, and administrative policies 
surrounding the four primary massacres perpetrated by the United States during this time. 
An ideology of racial superiority and fears of insecurity, impurity, and insurgency drove 
the actions of the white settler-colonialists and their military counterparts. Still, despite 
the theoretical emphasis on massacre in genocide theory, massacres on the Plains were 
relatively rare compared to the use of other genocidal tactics. This demonstrates that 
contemporary genocide theorists must be careful not to unintentionally limit thinking on 
genocide to strict military or militia led violence. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 
At noon on November 28, 1864, Colonel Chivington’s 3rd Volunteer Cavalry of 
Colorado surrounded Fort Lyon and threatened to shoot any 1st Regiment soldiers that 
attempted to leave. Col. Chivington had cut off all mail coming in and out of southern 
Colorado during his march south, and the soldiers of Fort Lyon were given no warning 
that he was coming. The standoff lasted only moments before Major Anthony opened the 
gates and Col. Chivington marched inside the fort. Far from being a territorial battle in 
the midst of the American Civil War, the Fort Lyon guard, under Maj. Anthony, and Col. 
Chivington’s Thirdsters were, in fact, very much on the same side. 
Maj. Anthony was surprised by Chivington’s appearance, but welcomed the Col. 
into the fort, where Chivington explained that he was seeking to attack the Indian camps 
that lay along the Arkansas River. He hoped to start with Black Kettle’s camp of 
Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho, around 40 miles to the north. Maj. Anthony agreed, 
saying the only reason he had not gone north himself was lack of manpower. He ordered 
the 125 Fort Lyon 1st Regiment soldiers to prepare to march north. Chief Black Kettle 
had repeatedly assured U.S. military and civilian authorities of his commitment to 
friendship with the United States. His assurances seem to have had little effect on 
Anthony’s enthusiasm for the mission. Chivington himself had heard Black Kettle’s 
commitments to peace when he was present at a meeting between the Cheyenne chief and 
Governor Evans earlier that year.  Despite this, in the words of the 1860s, both men 
belonged to the military’s “extermination” faction when it came to how to deal with the 
“red menace.”  
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In response to Chivington’s proposed course of action, a group of officers led by 
Captain Soule and Lieutenant Cramer protested the plan, reminding Chivington and 
Anthony that Major Wynkoop, the previous head of Fort Lyon, had promised Black 
Kettle U.S. protection. They also reminded Maj. Anthony that he had disarmed the camp 
following negotiations over food rations. Moreover, John S. Smith, a U.S. interpreter, 
was accompanying some military personnel on a trading and intelligence gathering 
rendezvous with Black Kettle’s camp. Chivington’s reply was swift, “Damn any man in 
sympathy with the Indians.” 
A mutiny against the superior numbers of the 3rd Colorado Cavalry and two 
superior officers would have meant death. At 8pm, Cpt. Soule, Lt. Cramer, and the other 
protesting officers followed Col. Chivington north with Maj. Anthony and the rest of the 
combined force of the Colorado Thirdsters and Fort Lyon 1st Regiment. The men 
marched through the night, arriving at Black Kettle’s camp at dawn. Col. Chivington 
ordered no prisoners to be taken (231, Josephy, Jr.) The soldiers drove off the 
Cheyenne’s’ horse herd, then assaulted the camp. In a desperate attempt to remind the 
soldiers that the camp was friendly and stop the attack, Black Kettle raised the American 
flag he had proudly received from an Indian agent, with a smaller white flag underneath.1 
Black Kettle’s attempt to surrender would prove fruitless. 
With cries of revenge for the Hungate family, the soldiers rushed forward, firing 
indiscriminately.2 The Thirdsters, poorly trained and over-zealous, caught some 1st 
Regiment soldiers in a crossfire. This provided Cpt. Soule and Lt. Cramer an excuse to 
                                                     
1 Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), 88 
 
2 The Hungate family was killed in June earlier that year. 
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pull their soldiers back. At the sound of the gunfire, John Smith left his tent and moved 
towards the soldiers, hoping to explain that the camp was friendly and that there were 
U.S. personnel nearby. The troops fired several volleys at the approaching interpreter. 
John Smith fled back to his tent until he was later captured and brought to Chivington. 
The Cheyenne and Arapaho fought the U.S. troops with the few old hunting rifles 
and bows they had at the camp. The elderly, children, and other non-combatants fled to 
the plains and up the dried creek bed. The warriors dug holes in the sides of the creek bed 
for protection and fired over the bank to defend those hiding inside. The U.S. soldiers 
fired into the holes, killing those within. A six-year-old girl came out of one hole with a 
white flag and was promptly shot down. The soldiers then approached the hole and killed 
all the women huddled inside.  
Within a short time, most of those able to fight or flee had done so, and the killing 
took on an almost leisurely tone. A man saw a toddler stumbling about and nudged his 
comrade. He aimed, fired, and missed the child. The other soldier said, “Let me try the 
son of a bitch, I can hit him.” He brought his rifle to his shoulder, fired, and missed. A 
third passing soldier approached, said something to the same effect, fired, and the child 
dropped. Further on, a woman lay on the bank, her leg broken by a shell. An approaching 
soldier broke the arm she raised to defend herself. She attempted to defend herself with 
her other arm, which the soldier also struck and broke. The soldier left her to die in the 
sand and snow. 
After seven hours of violence, all who had been camped with Black Kettle had 
either managed to flee, or been shot down by Chivington’s Thirdsters. Rather than chase 
after the Cheyenne and Arapaho who had fled, the soldiers went back over the battlefield, 
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looting the lodges and cutting and mutilating the fallen Cheyenne. Genitals were cut off 
and stuffed into mouths, scrotums saved to make tobacco pouches, and labia stretched 
over sticks and hats and paraded around. Infants were thrown in feedboxes, hearts carved 
out and put on sticks, and all were scalped.  
Over the next two days, Chivington’s men gathered the captured herd of horses, 
stole what they could carry, and burned whatever they elected to not take with them. 
Soldiers pulled John Smith’s captured son, a “half-breed” named Jack, out of his tent and 
shot him in cold blood, despite appeals for his utility as a translator.3 After the attack, 
Chivington chose not to move north towards the Dog Soldier military encampments of 
the Cheyenne nation, but south to search for Little Raven’s encampment. After four days, 
he abandoned the search and returned to Denver where he was met with celebrations over 
his company’s “brilliant feat of arms” against the Cheyenne nation.4  
Contrary to what is taught in many American schools, the genocide of the 
indigenous people of the United States was not always a quiet affair of disease and stoic 
disappearance into the twilight of history. Rather, the colonial settlers of the United 
States systematically eliminated nations in order to clear the way for American 
                                                     
3 His father, John Smith, would later go to Washington to give his deposition to various Congressional 
investigations. 
 
4 This introduction was compiled from a collection of sources: Hugh J. Reilly, The Frontier Newspapers 
and the Coverage of the Plains Indian Wars (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2010); Senate, “The 
Chivington Massacre,” Reports of the Committees, 39 Cong., 2 sess.  (Washington, DC: Washington 
Government Printing Office, 1867); United States War Department, “War of the Rebellion,” The War of 
the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.  Four series, 
128 volumes.  Series I - Volume XLI - Part I.  Washington: Government Printing Office. 1880-1901.; 
Senate, “Sand Creek Massacre,” Report of the Secretary of War, Sand Creek Massacre, Sen. Exec. Doc. 
No. 26, 39 Cong., 2 sess.  (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1867); Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at 
Wounded Knee (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970). 
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settlement. This thesis explores how ideologies and military strategies at different levels 
of American society interacted during the settler colonial invasion of the “Great 
American Desert,” and the subsequent destruction of indigenous sovereignty over the 
Great Plains. In the end, an ideology of racial supremacy and fears of contamination, 
insecurity, and insurgency contributed to massacre on the Great Plains. These massacres, 
however, do not tell the whole story. Because of the influence of national power on the 
tactics of genocide we find that the theoretical conceptions of genocide may be applicable 
to the massacres that occurred, but they are not sufficient when dealing with genocides 
that use primary tactics that are dissimilar to the most often cited genocides of the past, 
such as the genocides in Germany, Rwanda, and the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Theories of Genocide and Mass Killing 
“I was born upon the prairie, where the wind blew free and there was nothing to 
break the light of the sun. I was born where there was no enclosures and where 
everything drew a free breath.” Parra-Wa-Samen (Ten Bears) of the Yamparika 
Comanches.5 
Since the Holocaust, researchers have put feverish effort into understanding how 
societies attempt to eliminate ethnic groups. Improved predictive models are increasingly 
allowing prevention practitioners to know when and where mass violence will occur, 
which gives them the ability to engage where aid is most needed. These models show the 
importance of recognizing concrete variables of mass violence, such as political 
instability, as well as less concrete variables such as ideology. Because ideology is both 
amorphous and integral to the process of genocide, this thesis focuses on the reasoning 
                                                     
5Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, 242 
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behind genocidal actions. In order to intervene in situations of genocide, patterns of 
thinking that contribute to genocide must be recognizable and theories of genocide must 
be sound. Theories that propose ideological underpinnings that encourage genocide must 
be critiqued with case study in order to verify their utility in recognizing genocidal intent. 
Part of why genocidal theory seems incomplete is the strict intellectual 
association between genocide and mass killing.6 Because the most famous genocides of 
our time were greatly defined by the episodes of mass murder that they contained, 
contemporary theories of genocide put a great deal of focus on mass killing as the result 
of genocidal ideology. This focus on mass killing, however, provides an incomplete 
understanding of genocide. Contemporary theories often focus too greatly on a single 
aspect of genocidal enterprises, namely, mass killing. Mass killing is not the only tool in 
an enterprising génocidaire’s toolbox. That said, the primary focus of this thesis will be 
the massacres that occurred. They should, according to theory, exemplify the reasons and 
reasoning of the genocidal enterprise. The argument could be presented as follows, “if 
mass killing occurred, and genocide occurred, they must be related.” The data will help 
demonstrate to what extent mass killing is related to genocide, and whether mass killing 
paints the entire picture.  
Second, contemporary theories of genocide often focus on either a bottom-up or 
top-down approach. Straus makes note that existing theoretical literature examines either 
state level top-down approaches to genocide or perpetrator-level explanations of 
                                                     
6 This thesis uses mass killing, mass murder, and massacre interchangeably. Definitions of massacre can 
make this relation complicated, but for the purposes of this study the killing of a group of non-combatant 
people, especially when unarmed or providing no organized resistance, will be treated as massacre, mass 
killing, or mass murder. 
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participation.7 Contemporary genocide studies fails to engage in research that examines 
how mass violence is shaped by the interactions between local and national actors.8 
Genocide is an aggregate of acts of violence during a period of time. Therefore, what 
must be further explored is how state-level and local-level acts can differ in intent, scope, 
and motivation. Furthermore, the ways in which national and sub-national actors 
influence each other is of vital importance.9 Our predictive models can therefore be 
improved by recognizing how genocidal ideology can differ at various levels and 
different geographic spaces in a society.  
At present, there are two models that seek to predict genocide, one created by 
Harff in 2003 and one created by Goldsmith et al. in 2013. The major difference between 
the two is the unconditional two-stage approach used by Goldsmith et al. that allows the 
model to sample data globally, while Harff’s model is built from episodes of genocide 
and politicide occurring after 1945.1011  
These models, and the body of research that surrounds them, empirically 
demonstrate that almost all cases of genocide and politicide occur in the context of 
                                                     
7 Scott, Straus, “‘Destroy Them to Save Us’: Theories of Genocide and the Logics of Political Violence,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 24:4, 556 
 
8 Straus, “Destroy Them to Save Us,” 557. 
 
9 For an exemplary study on these aspects in instances of civil war, see Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of 
Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
 
10 Benjamin Goldsmith, Charles Butcher, Dimitri Semenovich, and Arcot Sowmya, “Forecasting the onset 
of genocide and politicide: Annual out-of-sample forecasts on a global dataset, 1988-2003,” Journal of 
Peace Research, 50(4) 437-452 
 
11Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political 
Mass Murder since 1955,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 57-73 
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political upheaval.12 It is important to note that the majority of periods of political 
upheaval have not been met with genocide or politicide, suggesting that genocide is 
mostly dependent on political upheaval, but political upheaval alone does not predict 
genocide.13 Additionally, Harff argues that while active discrimination against ethnic 
minorities is a significant causal factor leading to ethnic war, it does not explain which 
episodes of war are more likely to result in genocide or politicide.14 This suggests that 
other variables are highly influential after the initial conditions of upheaval have been 
met.  
Harff found extremist exclusionary ideologies to be a primary variable in 
identifying a state’s likelihood to commit genocide or politicide.15 This exclusionary 
ideology is defined as “some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to 
restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people.”16 Goldsmith et al. found a 
                                                     
12 “an abrupt change in the political community caused by the formation of a state or regime through 
violent conflict, redrawing of state boundaries, defeat in international war… revolutions, anticolonial 
rebellions, separatist wars, coups, and regime transitions that result in the ascendancy of political elites who 
embrace extremist ideologies.” Ibid. 62 
 
13 See Harff, “No Lessons Learned,” 57-73; Benjamin Valentino and Jay Ulfelder. “Assessing Risks of 
State-Sponsored Mass Killing,” Political Instability Task Force. (February, 2008); Goldsmith et al., 
“Forecasting the onset of genocide and politicide,” 437-452. 
 
14 Harff, “No Lessons Learned,” 70. 
 
15Harff’s other primary variables include political instability, habituation as a strategic response, 
authoritarian regimes, ethnic minority political elite, and international economic interdependence. As 
mentioned, the first one is widely seen as a precondition of mass violence, both in quantitative and 
theoretical research. The latter two would have had minimal effect on the United States in the 1850s, as the 
United States was ruled by an ethnic majority and not beholden to the United Nations rules on human rights 
and genocide because they had yet to be invented or enforced. Democracy in the United States is more 
complicated, because the U.S. was a full democracy, but centralized power was weak on the peripheries 
and during the Civil War. This will be examined in greater detail during the analysis. Also see Harff, 
Goldsmith et al., Valentino et al., Valentino and Ulfelder, Sémelin, Jones, Straus. 
 
16 Harff, “No Lessons Learned,” 63 
 
9 
 
similar statistically significant variable in state-led discrimination.17 Harff focuses on 
state violence, thus her model does not examine how exclusionary ideology may affect 
actions by local-level actors, regardless of whether the state itself pursues a policy of 
violence based on exclusionary ideology. She does not examine how exclusionary 
ideology of local-level actors on the periphery may outweigh a regime that is not a strong 
proponent of such ideology, ignoring bottom-up approaches. Because this thesis seeks to 
examine how ideology and actions may differ between local and national actors, the 
ideology of both levels, and the subsequent actions of both levels, becomes vitally 
important. Furthermore, increased knowledge of the motivations, justifications, and 
insight behind efforts to restrict, persecute, and eliminate provides multiple areas of 
intervention in contemporary cases of genocide. 
A second important area to cover in order to analyze genocidal actions and intent 
are conceptual models of genocide theory. These theories help examine the ways that 
national and subnational actors begin to formulate a plan of mass violence, and give 
suggestions as to how they might influence each other. Two primary theories of 
genocide, both focusing on massacre as a primary tool of genocide, will be examined 
here. One alternative explanation of massacre will be provided to critique these primary 
theories. 
 
 
                                                     
17 Goldsmith et al. received the data that would be needed to include exclusionary ideology in the final 
stages of the model creation, and due to its conditional usage chose not to use the data, nor the variable, in 
their model. They use several other variables that might suggest this ideology, and make the note that it is 
an important intuitive predictor of mass violence. Goldsmith et al., “Forecasting the onset of genocide and 
politicide,” 442. 
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“Purify and Destroy” 
Jacques Sémelin is a representative author on genocide theory, who sees genocide 
as being primarily born out of collective anxiety. His thesis is rooted in individual 
childhood fears of destruction which perceives aggression in strangers, even if they are 
not openly hostile.18 He later cites theories of aggression which argue that societies 
operate similarly, with the unknown causes of instability producing anxiety. Individual 
fears of societal destruction and suffering lead them to associate that anxiety with out-
groups.19 Given a known cause of destruction and suffering, the society will place, or are 
encouraged to place, hostility and aggressive intent on the other group, justifying their 
anxiety. Their anxiety becomes an existential fear of this hostile enemy.20 This fear 
evolves into a hatred, which Sémelin argues “inevitably boils down to eliciting in society 
the desire to destroy what has been designated as the source of fear.”21  
Still, there are many examples of societies which do not translate anxiety to fear 
of the ‘other.’22 Though Sémelin does not state this explicitly, it is implied the idea that 
genocide is the end of a spectrum of violence. The goal is to explain “how violence can 
                                                     
18 Jacques Sémelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide, trans. Cynthia 
Schoch. (New York : Colombia University Press, 2007), 20 
 
19 Ibid.  
 
20 Ibid., 16 
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 Sémelin also argues that there are always actors who will naturally “denounce… outrageous demagogy.” 
The fear of ‘other’ ideology is never guaranteed “ascendancy over public opinion” (16). Indeed, even when 
an ideological power holds sway politically there will be resisters, such as mixed couples refusing to 
divorce, even in Nazi controlled Germany, in that case providing a “resistance of the heart [that was]… a 
recurring problem for the Nazis.” Ibid., 30. 
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multiply its destructive intensity.”23 Sémelin theorizes that genocidal ideology is born of 
three ideological underpinnings: identity, purity, and security.  
Sémelin begins his analysis through an exploration of identity creation. A practice 
common to all humans, the creation of identity relies on distinguishing the self from 
others, or the collective from other collectives. Sémelin sees this collective identity 
creation as “basically a narcissistic inclination” in which the individual hopes to 
“distinguish oneself and reinforce one’s own self-esteem.”24 More important to Sémelin 
is the “rebirth or recomposition of ‘us’ as a collective response to a situation of crisis, 
trauma or intense upheaval.”25 Sémelin posits that a common response for individuals 
reacting to fear is to root themselves in a collective identity in order to comfortably react 
as a “community.”26   
While identity is not necessarily an issue for Sémelin, the nationalist fervor that 
he portrays becomes dangerous in the ways it manifests pride and collective identity. In 
particular, he examines the “stigmatization of minor differences.”27 The collective seeks 
to maintain “oneness,” especially in reaction to crisis, and in this “search for ‘oneness’” 
will begin targeting political dissidents of the in-group before targeting those that are 
                                                     
23 Ibid., 41. 
 
24 Ibid., 28. 
 
25 Ibid., 24-27 
 
26 Ibid., 28. 
 
27 Ibid., 27. 
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more identifiably ‘other.’28 Simply put, the common genocidal refrain seems to be, 
“you’re either with us or against us.” 
The culmination of these efforts to create and fulfill a common identity is an 
eventual “quest for purity.” This naturally begins with purity of identity, where there is a 
right and wrong way to be however the collective identity is defined. As Sémelin notes, 
however, “to define oneself as ‘pure’ in fact implies categorizing some ‘other’ as 
impure.”29 While a dichotomy between pure and impure seems unrealistic, Sémelin notes 
that during times of crisis, a human under threat immediately seeks out those who “wish 
[them] good” as opposed to “evil.”30 
Further, Sémelin notes the common association of the nation with an organic 
body, and references biology, epidemiology, or metaphors of blood.31 This metaphor 
allows the ‘other’ to be defined as disease or vermin, and serves as an aid to the process 
of dehumanization that accompanies various forms of violence. Metaphors of impurity 
and dehumanization are seen by various researchers as particularly informative in 
examinations of genocide.32 Sémelin rhetorically asks, “Is this Other in excess even 
                                                     
28 Note Sémelin’s examples of concentration camps originally being used to house socialist and communist 
prisoners, Milosevic targeting Yugoslavian communists, and Hutu extremists targeting Hutu moderates as 
well as Tutsis, even before the genocide. Ibid., 31, 33. 
 
29 Ibid., 33. 
 
30 Ibid. 
 
31 Ibid., 33, 34, 37, respectively. See also Mann, Michael.  The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic 
Cleansing, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.) 
 
32 See Gregory Stanton, “The Ten Stages of Genocide” retrieved from http://www.genocidewatch.com/ten-
stages-of-genocide; Nick Haslam and Steve Loughnan, “Dehumanization and Infrahumanization,” Annual 
Review of Psychology (2014) 65:399-423; Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction 2nd 
Edition (New York: Routledge, 2011.) 
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human, in fact?” and continues, stating that “the ‘bestialization’ of the enemy is a highly 
significant indicator of the potential unleashing of violence against him.”33 The repetitive 
metaphor of vermin, insect, or disease provides justification for both elimination and 
separation, in part thanks to the automatic revulsion that accompanies an association with 
the unhealthy vectors of sickness that the ‘other’ is associated with.34 Sémelin argues that 
this association becomes a fear of the ‘impure other’ that is ‘contaminating’ the ‘organic 
body’ of the nation, state, or ‘people’. The result is a desire to destroy the contaminant in 
order to protect and preserve the nation. This desire to protect and preserve is also central 
to Sémelin’s final underpinning of genocide, which is a threat to the security of the ‘in-
group’. 
This threat to the security of the ‘in-group’ can be real, imagined, or both. As 
Jones aptly states, “nearly every génocidaire considers himself or herself oppressed by 
the target group.”35 The common rhetorical emphasis is well summarized by Sémelin as 
well, “We are the victims of History. If we are all victims, we certainly have the right to 
defend ourselves against Them! Besides, didn’t they slaughter us in the past?” The next 
conclusion is, “won’t they slaughter/oppress us in the future?” This idea was widely 
publicized by anti-Semitics in Nazi Germany before the Holocaust.36 Both in the case of 
                                                     
33 Sémelin, Purify and Destroy, 38. 
 
34 Adam Jones. Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction 2nd Edition. (New York: Routledge, 2011.) 390-
394 
 
35 Jones, Genocide, 396. 
 
36 I am referring here to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a fabricated document published in 1903 
connecting Jews to a secret conspiracy to control the planet using economic power and espionage. This was 
also used as an “explanation” for Germany’s defeat in World War I, reinforcing an identity building belief 
in German superiority and invincibility. Sémelin, Purify and Destroy, 44. 
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Nazi Germany and 1994 Rwanda, the belief of imminent threat was used by extremists to 
‘justify’ a ‘preemptive attack’. This ‘imminent threat’ logic can occur regardless of how 
legitimate or realistic the threat may be. The Jewish population in 1930s Germany, for 
example, was so small that it could have constituted no real threat to the power of the 
German government.37 1994 Rwanda was in the midst of a civil war, constituting a 
legitimate threat of armed violence that extremists could reference when rallying allies to 
their cause. Sémelin returns to collective anxiety, stating that the narrative of an enemy 
threatening the nation, country, or collective “reinforces this feeling of anxiety.”38 These 
threats against identity, purity, and security contribute to the construction of identity 
narratives that justify violence against the ‘other’. These collective anxieties justify a 
collective’s desire to “destroy them to save us.”39  
One area of Sémelin’s theory that has yet to be thoroughly explored is to whom it 
applies. Sémelin certainly applies this theory to the elite leaders of governments and 
militaries who use these excuses in order to mobilize groups to attack other groups, 
however the exact motivations, on a perpetrator level, can be more complicated. Michael 
Mann, as an example, briefly explores nine different common perpetrator level 
motivation.40 Furthermore, these collective feelings of anxiety, security, purity, and 
identity must be examined in relation to how they affect and motivate controlling 
                                                     
37 Note here, however, the connection between Jews and an outside threat in the Jewish-Bolshevik 
conspiracy. As this collective anxiety searches for a source it continues to project until it can be seen as 
legitimate, if not rational. 
 
38 Sémelin, Purify and Destroy, 43. 
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subnational actors, especially as subnational actors affect democracies or partial 
democracies. 
 
“Blood and Soil” 
Ben Kiernan provides a different viewpoint of how genocide occurs. His theory 
offers a greater focus on the settler colonial genocides perpetrated by the United States 
and Australia. In his greatly inclusive book studying genocide from early antiquity to the 
present, Kiernan explores the underpinnings of genocide because “informed deterrence or 
timely prevention are more feasible if common features of perpetrators’ genocidal 
thinking can be identified in advance of their rise to power.” As such, he goes forth 
examining the interweaving “obsessions” that supply “lethal ideological ammunition to 
projects of violent militarism and territorial expansion.”41 
Kiernan theorizes three primary ideological features that are common in genocide: 
racism, cults of antiquity, and cults of agrarian land expansion.42 These features inform 
and guide the rest of his inquiry into genocide from antiquity to modernity, and they are 
all marked as involving “idealized conceptions of the world, utopian or dystopian, 
divorced from reality but capable of being forcefully imposed upon it.”43 Racism in 
Kiernan’s sense is the perceived inferiority or threat of a group based on its imagined 
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fixed characteristics. This is not limited to the five “great” racial groups, and can include 
national groups, ethnic groups, tribes, bands, etc.44 The perpetrators may see a victim 
group as inferior or backwards, or see themselves as superior; likely the racist belief will 
be built on both.45 This is usually accompanied by a “phobia of contamination” which 
leads to forced distance.46 This includes, but is not limited to, preventing “contamination” 
of women by the men of the target group, and enforcing segregation of contact, if 
possible.47 Kiernan theorizes that this belief leads perpetrators to imagine “a world 
without certain kinds of people in it.”48 Kiernan argues that this fantasy is further 
compounded by obsessions with “antiquity” and “agrarianism.” 
Kiernan’s “cult of antiquity” is defined as a “preoccupation with restoring purity 
and order.”49 Interestingly, Kiernan emphasizes the “return to an imagined pure origin,” 
however his examples of origins are often unrelated directly to the cultures that claim 
them. His examples include Hitler considering classical Sparta as a model racialist state, 
English and Dutch imperialists invoking ancient Roman precedent, Muscovy grand 
princes claiming descent from Augustus Caesar, and colonialists seeing native subjects as 
“ancient Scythian barbarians rematerializ[ed].”50 This imagined pure history is repeated 
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as a justification for “eradication of foreign contamination,” regardless of whether the 
“foreign contamination” is based in real history or not. Though Kiernan emphasizes the 
past, the antiquity that this ideology is based around is, rather, an identity fantasy built 
out of a racialized narrative of superiority. Regardless of the origin, this obsession is 
marked by a desire to “arrest a perceived decline, restore a lost utopia, or inscribe a 
purportedly ancient model on someone else’s land.”51 Interestingly, the emphasis is not 
on the purity aspect of foreign contamination, but on the idealization of antiquity. The 
foreign contamination, in this case, is a metaphor for invasion, but is not conceptualized 
by its relation to disease or vermin. 
Finally, an interesting, and relatively unique, aspect of Kiernan’s theory is his 
“cult of cultivation” which argues that agrarian societies develop a sense of superiority 
that stems from land use, and results in an intense desire to dispossess hunter-gatherers or 
pastoralists in order to gain agricultural land.52 This, argues Kiernan, is a modern 
development that began valorizing farm labor as being morally superior and creating 
healthier lifestyles. This romantic view of the agriculturalists was transplanted to the 
colonies as it was being developed. This ideology created a sense that agriculture was 
indicative of man taming the chaotic natural world. This romance of agrarianism, coupled 
with economic competition and a desire for territorial expansion, served as justification 
for the removal of indigenous people from their lands.53 While an emphasis on this 
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obsession seems rare, it is referenced in other theories. Sémelin, for example, references 
agrarianism as a means to the end of “purity” saying: 
 “This metaphor [of purity] can be extended to the need to defend the purity of 
civilization against the corruption of modernity. The outcome is often an apologia of 
nature and particularly peasants, the true champions of tradition and the eternal soul of 
the people.”54 
 In the nineteenth-century the cult began to be combined with national identity, 
with peasant farmers representing the purist form of the nation. This obsession is joined 
with the aforementioned racist ideology to justify agrarianism not as an ideal by itself, 
but as an ideal for the agriculturalists of “the nation.”55 Kiernan points out that this cult 
was transplanted to colonial nations, such as Australia and the Thirteen Colonies, 
however the sense of national or ethnic superiority proved more powerful than the 
celebration of agriculture, as settlers violently pushed indigenous land managers off their 
land.56 
Kiernan’s theory considers this obsession with agriculture as a defining reason for 
settler greed and territorial expansion. Importantly, this is without mentioning greed 
being a hallmark of mass violence, as theorized in Jones’ summary of psychological 
theories of genocide. Jones notes, “greed is more than a desire for material goods beyond 
those necessary for survival. It is intimately connected to the existential hunger for 
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power, domination, and prestige.”57 Kiernan does not explicitly mention greed, but it is 
interesting to note that as this romantic view of agrarianism continued to grow, so too did 
the number of people living in cities, rather than the rural pastures that were so 
romanticized.58 In fact, Kiernan argues that the push for agricultural land and the 
romanticism of nature came primarily from urban writers.59 
Kiernan sums up his theory of perpetration by exploring the “prudent 
compromise” present in committing genocide.60 He states that genocide is “usually 
undertaken by radical, unstable regimes” that “silence domestic differences by focusing 
attention on an external, supposedly common threat.”61 Kiernan perceives state-
sponsored mass killing as a chaotic time, with rapidly changing alliances, differing 
information depending on audiences, and the mobilization of enormous human, material, 
and administrative resources.62 This reflects the elite exclusionary ideology and political 
instability present in Harff and Goldsmith et al.’s models. Despite what seems to be a 
top-down theorization, he clarifies that genocide need not be state-sponsored, or even 
consistently focused on killing. He provides Lemkin’s definition of cultural genocide and 
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Kuper’s views of the widespread phenomenon of “genocidal massacres” as alternatives to 
the widely intuited state-sponsored mass killings that occupies much research focus.63  
 
Massacre as a Tactic of War 
Finally, an important approach to explaining genocide on the Great Plains is 
summarized by the critical perspective that mass killings without regard to combat status 
is a strategic response to threats to political power. There is a reliable theoretical 
emphasis on genocide occurring during times of insecurity, and particularly during 
periods of war.64 Indeed, some of the most commonly cited examples of genocide all fit 
within this criteria, including the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, Rwanda, and 
Bosnia.  
Sémelin, despite his strong emphasis on genocide being born from ideology, does 
imply instability as a powerful driver for the creation of exclusionary ideology, saying “If 
our own country sink into an increasingly serious economic crisis, with dismal parades of 
millions of unemployed, if it was harassed by terrorist attacks, each one bloodier than the 
last, how long would we remain impervious to this way of thinking? No society, when it 
falls apart, is exempt from such processes [of mass violence].”65 For Sémelin, war 
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increases instability, which increases the collective anxiety of a nation and the search for 
enemies, which in turn leads to more common use of violence.  
Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay point to wars which combat insurgency as a 
specific kind of war that offers strategic incentives for targeting civilian populations.66 
Because insurgencies tend to avoid battles that directly pit their forces against the often 
larger and better equipped state forces, armies leading counterinsurgency campaigns 
often “choose to target the guerrillas’ base of support in the population.”67 Also important 
is the finding that insurgent groups that “lack popular support or do not pose a serious 
military threat to the regime” are more likely to be kept “in check without targeting 
civilians in large numbers.”68 
This theory was further tested by Valentino and Ulfelder’s 2008 analysis. They 
theorized from these studies that mass killing is the result of a “rationalist view… in 
which deliberate violence against noncombatant civilians is understood as a tactic used 
by weak or insecure governments against political challengers.”69 This makes the 
targeting of noncombatants an “instrumental tactic” that regimes use to respond to 
threats.70 State weakness in this context is not limited to states that do not have strong 
“financial resources [or] policy choices” but can also reflect the “penetration of the 
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central state into the periphery.”71 Importantly, this theoretical framework reflects an 
explanation of genocide which allows for mass violence without relying on an ideological 
framework that demands extermination, though it is not mutually exclusive with such a 
framework. 
Like many theories, these theories ultimately explore genocide through an 
emphasis on massacre. This forces prevention practitioners to give an inordinate amount 
of theory weight, and therefore predictive weight, to genocides that emphasized 
massacre. The mass killing events that will be explored will be examined according to 
how they relate to identity, purity, security, agrarianism, cults of antiquity, and 
counterinsurgency and to what extent these facets of motivation can be seen. Through 
better understanding of the underlying motivations that affect subnational and national 
actors, theory can be critiqued and refined to present better points of intervention. 
 
Plains Nations and the United States in Context 
 The story of genocide in the United States spans two hundred and fifty years of 
history. Due to the length of time, and the many other genocides that seem to take 
academic precedence, many genocide theorists do not explore this period with deep 
cultural and situational analysis. As such, it is common to see theorists generalizing 
information, which leads to missing the nuances, perspectives, and depth of reasons for 
the violence that occurred over that long and somber history. 
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For activism around the genocide of the Native Americans this is as effective an 
approach as is needed. Regardless of which genocidal practices are given more or less 
weight, virtually all methods of ethnic extermination were used. For a practitioner of 
genocide prevention, however, this generalization of the many tribes, ethnicities, and 
peoples of the Americas should raise some red flags. While there were many 
ideologically driven genocidal massacres in the history of the United States, it is 
dangerous to refer to these massacres as if they all happened to one people, because, at 
the level of analysis, we must recognize that the indigenous nations of the Americas 
responded to the threat of the white man in many different ways. Likewise, the genocidal 
practices used by the United States changed over time and depending on nation. 
Furthermore, the inclination and tactical decision making of the government, the demos, 
and the military changed over time as well, often in ways that ended up conflicting with 
each other. Therefore, in order to best use information from this time period to develop 
genocide prevention practices, there must be a careful and thorough examination of the 
context in which specific acts of genocide took place. 
That being said, the goal of this brief history is not to give the reader a complete 
sense of everything that occurred within the main conflict periods of the Plains Indian 
Wars.72 There are excellent books and resources that cover that, and not enough time to 
give every event its due attention. Rather, the goal of this brief cultural history is to give 
researchers without thorough knowledge of Plains Indian cultures some contextual 
information for better understanding of the specific events that follow. Certain 
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information, such as differences between the United States and the various Plains Indian 
nations’ governance structures, cultural values, and worldviews, will help demonstrate 
some of the underlying tensions and miscommunications that led to U.S. adoption of 
specific genocidal practices. 
For the purposes of this study, the Plains Indian nations and the United States 
culturally differed in three key areas: warfare, government, and land ownership.73 
Historically, Plains Indian warfare was characterized by its role as a “proving ground” for 
young men, and not always a tool to achieve “national objectives” or as an “instrument of 
policy.”74 Conversely, the settlers who began moving into the plains saw war as a means 
to achieve the goal of supremacy and national security. Furthermore, for the Plains 
Indians the death of your enemies was not necessary for victory in battle or even for 
victory in the war itself. Settler warfare, on the other hand, achieved victory in battle by 
“inflicting as many casualties as possible and thereby reduce their enemy’s numbers.”75 
Several chapters in Marshall’s biography of Crazy Horse deal with Crazy Horse’s attempt 
to understand the changing nature of war on the Great Plains, and how Lakota 
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conceptions of warfare would have to change if they wanted to achieve victory via 
military means.76 
National goals on the Great Plains also differed. The U.S. government was 
seeking to achieve supremacy, security, and control of land, particularly when the land 
proved profitable due to gold or silver. On the other hand, for many groups of indigenous 
people the constant encroachment of settlers was a threat to their way of life. Even before 
the reservation system was established on the Great Plains and the United States sought 
to “civilize” the Plains Indians through cultural destruction, the Oregon Trail and the 
railroad divided traditional Plains Indians land in half. These two dividers created a 
distinct barrier between nations, such as the northern and southern Cheyenne, and caused 
great ecological harm due to over-intensive land use along the Oregon Trail and the 
disruption of migration patterns for buffalo herds. Because the economy of the Plains 
Indians relied almost entirely on the buffalo, disruption and destruction of the buffalo was 
a serious existential threat. 
The Plains Indians also had a very different conception of government than that of 
the United States. The United States emphasized a hierarchical system in which someone 
was chosen as a representative leader and could make decisions on behalf of the people. 
While there were certainly well respected leaders among the various tribes of the Plains 
Indians, that did not necessarily grant those leaders the power to make decisions for all 
members of a nation. A leader could lose power and respect over decisions, thus reducing 
that leader’s effectiveness in controlling the many members of the tribe. A good example 
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is the power held by military societies, such as the Hotamitaneos (Dog Soldiers) of the 
Southern Cheyenne. More inclined to follow younger warriors such as Roman Nose and 
Tall Bull, the younger men and Dog Soldiers could not always be corralled by Black 
Kettle, the agreed upon chief of the Southern Cheyenne.77 This led to significant conflict 
and misunderstanding between indigenous governments and the United States. The 
United States expected the “chief” of the Cheyenne to be able to decide on a course of 
action and be followed by younger members. This was not, effectively, the case, and 
when exploring events that occurred on the Great Plains, contemporary readers must be 
able to separate the “warring” and “peaceful” factions among the Cheyenne, as well as 
recognize how the U.S. government may have been unable to (or chose not to) do so. 
Plains Indian’ understanding of land ownership was looser and more collective 
than European understanding of land ownership. Land was seen as shared, sometimes in 
a community sense, and other times in a national sense. The Black Hills, for example, 
were “given” to the Lakota in the first Fort Laramie treaty, but the hills had traditionally 
been shared by the Cheyenne and the Lakota. In this sense, the treaty was built to fail, in 
part because invisible lines in the land meant little to the Cheyenne and Lakota people. 
The Plains Indians relied more on fluid conceptions of influence over space than treaty 
decided lines that would denote borders of influence. Another example comes out of a 
visit to the new city of Denver by Arapaho chief Little Raven who said he “was glad to 
see [the settlers] getting gold, but reminded them that the land belonged to the Indians, 
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and expressed the hope they would not stay around after they found all the yellow metal 
they needed.”78 
Lastly, during the 1800s the U.S. Supreme Court introduced a great deal of 
contradictory legal principles in regards to native nations, which are best summarized in 
Finkelman and Garrison’s Encyclopedia of United States Indian Policy and Law: 
“tribes are “tenants” not owners of their soil, but tribes are the true owners of their 
lands; tribes are domestic-dependent nations, but tribes are distinct and independent 
nations; tribes resemble “wards,” but tribes have a national status equal to that of foreign 
governments.”79 
 
This sounds confusing and contradictory, because it is. The legal statements 
above show the various shifts in view the Supreme Court had depending on the Court and 
the case, and created Indian law and policy that was often difficult to predict, due to 
varying precedent. What it shows, effectively, was the difficulty in using law and legal 
precedent as a basis for determining a federal, legal view of native people. Native people 
were sometimes viewed as legal wards of the state, and other times as sovereign; 
sometimes as fully human actors, and other times as uncivilized and unworthy of 
personhood or rights.  
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CHAPTER II 
MASSACRE ON THE PLAINS 
Sand Creek - 1864 
“Nothing lives long 
Only the earth and the mountains.” 
- White Antelope’s death song80 
 
The Sand Creek massacre is notable for its graphic violence and well documented 
mutilations. The arguments for why it occurred are often embedded in theoretical 
explanations that attempt to explain why genocidal violence against indigenous people of 
the United States generally occurred. Mann cites Sand Creek as an example of the part-
time volunteer forces receiving state wages that provided “more routine genocidal thrust” 
for the building of democracies.81 Kiernan rightly places Sand Creek as representative of 
the “exterminationist atmosphere among whites,” and uses it to support his overall thesis 
of genocides of extermination.82 Kiernan’s view will prove to be an incomplete, although 
not incorrect, assessment. 
There are competing narratives exploring why Sand Creek itself happened. The 
most plausible centers around the ever increasing fear and anger of the Coloradoan 
settlers and their push for the military to adopt extermination oriented policies. Of course, 
newspapers as far away as New York printed headlines and articles that explored 
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depredations in the territories. These stories ranged from outlaws in Arizona to Sioux 
warriors in Minnesota or, conversely, from Apache depredations in Arizona to outlaws in 
Minnesota.83 In 1862, failure to provide the promised food rations led increasingly 
desperate Sioux people to revolt and attack the surrounding towns. The Great Sioux 
Uprising dominated territory newspapers, particularly in Iowa and Minnesota. Leading to 
the largest mass execution in U.S. history, the real threat of Sioux attack contributed to an 
increase in militant viewpoints against all indigenous people in Minnesota, even the 
friendly Winnebagos.84 The Sioux were dehumanized, called “wild beasts,” and the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Dole stated that his purpose was to “utterly... 
exterminate the Sioux if I have the power to do so.”85 These built off a reputation that 
would remain consistent regarding Indian depredations, that the government was unable 
or unwilling to engage in the task of defending settlers against Indian violence.86 
Furthermore, editorials appealed to the government, stating that the “Sioux nation… must 
be exterminated or driven so far as to leave no room for apprehension that they will 
return.”87  
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Knowledge of these events, along with depredations that reflected raid warfare, 
and involved the theft of livestock, embedded in the Coloradoans “high levels of 
anxiety.”88 
This sense of general anxiety began to turn into legitimate fear on the part of the 
Coloradoans in the spring and summer of 1864, when militaristic factions in the 
Cheyenne nation, led by Roman Nose, gained greater influence.89 These factions 
advocated a military response to U.S. attacks on Cheyenne camps.90 Included among 
these attacks were the murder of the Hungate family south east of Denver. The bodies 
were brought to Denver and displayed. This transformed what may have been a remote 
fear into a very present and local fear. Now the failure of the U.S. government to secure 
the territories was not resulting in violence in Minnesota, California, or New Mexico, but 
at home, not 40 miles from Denver citizens’ doorsteps. And with the famous mobility of 
the Cheyenne nation, that violence could quickly occur anywhere in Colorado. 
In response, Governor Evans of the territory of Colorado issued a proclamation in 
June instructing traders and agents to inform all “friendly Indians” to relocate to specific 
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forts.91 Friendly Arapahoes and Cheyenne were instructed in this proclamation to relocate 
to Fort Lyon. Two months later, in a second proclamation, he authorized “all citizens of 
Colorado, either individually or in such parties as they may organize, to go in pursuit of 
all hostile Indians on the plains, scrupulously avoiding those who have responded to my 
said call to rendezvous at the points indicated.”92  
All of this took place in the context of the Civil War, and fears of alliances 
between the Confederate States and indigenous nations wishing to gain an upper hand 
against the United States was common and the source of great anxiety for settlers in the 
territories. The Rocky Mountain News connected the Confederacy and the Plains tribes in 
an article which stated, “They tell them that the whites in Colorado want their hunting 
grounds from them and will take their squaws and everything they have and if the Indian 
will join them they will go with them and take Denver and give the whole country to the 
Indian.”93 This connection between dangers both present and afar is similar in nature to 
the aforementioned Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy, although the latter was thoroughly a 
myth. In the United States there were native nations that allied with the Confederacy. The 
Cheyenne and Arapaho, however, were not among them.  
It was in this context of fear and insecurity that the Sand Creek Massacre 
occurred. The 3rd Colorado Volunteer Cavalry was made up of men from Denver. The 
Cavalry was led by Chivington, who was “ruthlessly ambitious, as well as contemptuous 
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of ethical or legal restraints,” and described by one of his superiors as “a crazy preacher 
who thinks he is Napoleon Bonaparte.”94 Chivington had close contact with Governor 
Evans, and had been part of an earlier meeting with Black Kettle, Maj. Wynkoop, and 
Governor Evans.95 
While a collection of sources was used to collect the description of the Sand 
Creek Massacre during the preface, the following is a singular, though indicative, 
description:   
“In going over the battle-ground the next day, I did not see a body of a man, woman, or 
child but what was scalped, and, in many instances, their bodies were mutilated in a most 
horrible manner--men, women, and children's privates cut out, &c. I heard one man say 
that he had cut a woman's private parts out, and had them for exhibition on a stick. I 
heard another man say that he had cut the fingers off of an Indian, to get the rings on his 
hand. According to the best of my knowledge and belief, these atrocities that were 
committed were with the knowledge of Col. J. M. Chivington, and I do not know of him 
taking any measures to prevent them. I heard of one instance of a child a few months old 
being thrown into the feed-box of a wagon, and, after being carried some distance, left on 
the ground to perish. I also heard of numerous instances in which men had cut out the 
private parts of females, and stretched them over their saddle-bows, and some of them 
over their hats.” 
- James D. Cannon96 
  
 The descriptions of the aftermath of the Sand Creek Affair do not offend only 
modern sensibilities and values. Three different federal investigations were initiated 
within a few months of the incident. The House of Representatives Committee on the 
Conduct of War issued a report which found it difficult to believe that the men would be 
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found “disgracing the uniform of United States soldiers and officers” or could “commit… 
such acts of cruelty and barbarity as are detailed in the testimony.”97 The House of 
Representatives’ investigation ended with the Chairman demanding that those “guilty of 
those brutal and cowardly acts” be punished, in order to uphold the “honor of the 
nation.”98  
Also present in the report was a reference to the bodies of the Hungate family 
being displayed in Denver, with the report arguing that “the bodies of persons killed at a 
great distance -- whether by the Indians or not is not certain -- were brought to the capital 
of the Territory and exposed to the public gaze, for the purpose of inflaming still more 
the already excited feeling of the people.”99  
And here again the people in the Colorado territory seem to be at odds with the 
federal government. Territory articles, editorials, and books were published following 
these events that defended Chivington’s actions and character, and argued for the moral 
necessity of defending the Colorado territory via extermination.100 The Rocky Mountain 
News was especially supportive. Before receiving the particulars of the battle, they 
reported “Five hundred Indians are reported killed…” and ended their article with “Bully 
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for the Colorado boys!”101 In a similar article the next day, the Daily Mining Journal 
implied that Col. Chivington had not gone far enough and, despite his failed run for 
Congress, might make better friends in Colorado by attacking more Cheyenne villages: 
“The people of Colorado will see renewed cause of thankfulness that they did not send 
Colonel Chivington to Congress since he appears to have again turned his attention to 
military matters. One more such blow, as of the avenging angel, inflicted upon the 
Devil’s own songs of the Plains, will quite reconcile us to Colonel Chivington. . . Two 
more such blows will make us warm admirers of the Methodist Colonel and if by any 
happy chance of fortune, he should be able to inflict three more, making in all a neat sum 
of 2,000 killed, the Journal will become his fast friend and support him for any office 
within the gift of the people of Colorado, at any time in the future for he will be worthy to 
be called her temporal savior.”102  
 
Furthermore, the Rocky Mountain News later attacked the Daily Mining Journal 
after the Journal implied that the slander against Soule, who held his troops back during 
the violence at Sand Creek, was in part instigated by the Rocky Mountain News.103 The 
Rocky Mountain News wrote that the Journal was, 
 “ever ready to excuse, justify or apologize for [Indian] acts… It thinks their 
stories repeated from mouth to mouth, through half-breeds, Indian traders, and 
sympathizers like itself, are far more reliable… than can be statements of a respectable 
white man, or the official reports of a sworn officer. There is the difference. Our 
sympathies are upon the side of the white man, and between the two stories, we incline to 
believe his. The Journal is exactly against us. It favors the indians, excuses the Indians, 
justifies the Indians, believes the Indians.”104  
  
This dichotomous thinking, which pits sympathizers, traders, “half-breeds,” and 
moderates among the “enemy” is reflected in genocidal violence throughout history.105 
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Further, it is reflected in Sémelin’s theory which states that in times of danger the human 
mind immediately separates friends from enemies. 
While the Rocky Mountain News remained fervent supporters of Col. Chivington 
and the “Bloody Thirdsters,” newspapers in the east began to follow the narrative of the 
federal government.106 Reporting about Indians, and Indian-settler conflict in general, 
however, remained a continuation of the malaise that accompanied articles about “Indian 
depredations” in the west.107  
There also seems to be little evidence that Kiernan’s cults of agrarianism or 
antiquity played an important role. Of course, the racism that represents one of the pillars 
of Kiernan’s thesis is present, but the reasoning for the violence at Sand Creek seems to 
be explained almost entirely and directly by these fears. There is no evidence that 
Chivington wanted to massacre Black Kettle’s band because they were hunter gatherers 
or to return to a gloried past of any kind. He was acting on the will of a populace caught 
in fear mongering and disgust. There is also little evidence that Chivington was 
attempting to engage in an attack on insurgents hiding among civilian populations. 
Chivington said “I have come to kill Indians, and it is right and honorable to use any 
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means under God’s heaven to kill Indians,” and based on his actions it seems as though 
he can be taken at his word.108 
Subnational representatives acting on fears of purity and threat, to the shock of 
national actors, are clearly present in the Sand Creek Massacre. Sémelin’s anxieties of 
identity, purity, and security are highly present at all levels of U.S. society before and 
after the Sand Creek Massacre. In particular, subnational actors, such as newspapers, 
editorialists, and military volunteers, were calling for extermination or ethnic cleansing of 
indigenous people throughout the time period. And yet, this type of mass killing was 
unseen on the Great Plains outside of direct military action where the perpetrators were 
given permission to engage in killing by an authority who was said to embody national 
power. As will be seen, this type of militia and grass-roots killing ended up being 
relatively rare in the Great Plains. The immediate condemnation of the U.S. federal 
government may be responsible for this reduction in ideologically inspired mass killings. 
This seems to give power to Straus’s hypothesis that genocide may be a unique form of 
violence perpetrated primarily by the will of national actors. 
Lastly, as shown by the swift investigation and condemnation by the federal 
government, there is clear difference in national and subnational action and strategic 
desire. These differences continued throughout the history of conflict on the Great Plains, 
but did not change the federal government’s overall strategy of military and political 
conquest of the Great Plains. The massacre at Sand Creek is representative of the 
complicated relationship between the people of the United States and the ongoing 
genocide of the Native Americans. In the territories, many people and newspapers saw 
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Sand Creek as a military success and a strong handed response to the threat of Indian 
depredations. And yet, although Sand Creek is used by many theorists as emblematic of 
the Native American genocide, within months the events at Sand Creek were publicly 
condemned in three investigations by the U.S. government and newspapers in the east. 
The Sand Creek Massacre is not the only example of massacre on the Great Plains, 
though it may be the best example of massacre through incitement of hatred and 
insecurity. 
 
Washita River – 1868 
“It will be a very hard thing to leave the country that God gave us. Our friends are buried 
there, and we hate to leave these grounds… This is hard on us. There at Sand Creek – 
White Antelope and many other chiefs lie there ; our women and children lie there… I do 
not feel disposed to go right off to a new country and leave them.” 
- Little Raven109 
 Four years after the attack on Sand Creek, almost to the day, Black Kettle’s camp 
would be attacked again. This time the attack would not be led by volunteers, but by the 
famous Lieutenant Colonel George Custer, acting on behalf of General Sheridan.110 
Between the two attacks the federal government had negotiated the Medicine Lodge 
Treaty between the United States and the southern Plains nations, which stipulated that 
the Southern Cheyenne and Arapahoe were to stay south of the Arkansas. From the U.S. 
perspective, compliance to the treaty would mean peace. Again, Cheyenne governance 
structure prevented this perspective from being as strictly true and effective as the U.S. 
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government wanted it to be. Three or four hundred Cheyennes were, at the time of the 
signing, following Roman Nose north, in refusal of the treaty.111 Over the next year 
annuities, arms, and ammunition that had been promised by the treaties were slow 
coming, and many young Cheyenne and Arapahoe men refused to accept the white 
federal government’s artificial boundaries or adopt white settler ways.112 As attacks and 
depredations in defiance of the treaty increased, a new peace commission assembled in 
Chicago, but an absence of key civilian votes gave Sherman and the army a majority.113 
They used this opportunity to increase army authority, and push for a more aggressive 
federal Indian policy.114 Sherman’s principal argument was, “either the Indians must give 
way, or we must abandon all west of the Missouri River, and confess. . . that forty 
millions of whites are cowed by a few thousand savages.”115  
At the time, the attitude of the settlers in the territories was similar, and had 
changed little since Sand Creek. Ongoing Indian raids were a danger to settlers and a 
threat to the ongoing construction of the railroad. In response to these attacks Sheridan 
gave orders to, “proceed south in the direction of the Antelope Hills, thence toward the 
Washita River, the supposed winter seat of the hostile tribes; to destroy their villages and 
ponies, to kill or hang all warriors, and bring back all women and children.”116 Indeed, 
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over the course of the fall, many of the young men and Dog Soldiers who had raided 
settler and military outposts had come to winter with Black Kettle along the Washita 
River in Oklahoma. There was now a strategic reason to attack Black Kettle’s camp. The 
United States wanted to capture and contain the wintering Dog Soldiers who had, in the 
view of the United States, violated the Medicine Lodge Treaty for the whole of the 
Cheyenne nation. 
Custer was instructed to attack the camp on the Washita River, and knowing the 
superior mobility of Cheyenne military and non-combatants, Custer split his command 
into multiple companies to most effectively prevent escape. Custer’s troops attacked from 
four directions, rather than advancing over the ford as Black Kettle expected him to do.117 
Custer’s troops destroyed Black Kettle’s village, captured 53 women and children, and 
marched north to avoid the retaliatory attacks by allied Kiowa and Comanche.118  
An historical analysis shows that the attack on Washita, unlike Sand Creek, was 
not done in the hopes of an easy victory over non-combatants or to kill as many native 
people as possible. The reasons why Sheridan chose to attack the camp on Washita has a 
great deal to do with both Sheridan’s conception of military victory and the realities of 
engaging in battle with Plains Indian forces. Wooster makes the point in his analysis of 
military policy that: 
“Large groups of Indians usually scattered shortly after discovering bluecoats 
nearby. Officers consequently found it extremely difficult to force Indians to fight 
pitched battles, where the army’s discipline and organization could be decisive. To 
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preclude the possibility of such dispersals, ambitious officers sought to surprise, encircle, 
and attack large Indian camps when discovered.”119 
 
In fact, Custer would use similar strategies against Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull’s 
forces during the Battle of the Greasy Grass, albeit to disastrous results. In both cases, the 
goal of capturing non-combatants was secondary to defeating a supremacy threatening 
insurgency. That said, the fact that non-combatants were present didn’t dissuade the 
military either. General Sherman, fresh from the Civil War, certainly felt strongly that 
one needed to attack the homes and villages of enemies saying, 
 “If a village is attacked and women and children killed, the responsibility is not 
with the soldiers but with the people whose crimes necessitated the attack. During the 
[Civil] war did any one [sic] hesitate to attack a village or town occupied by the enemy 
because women or children were within its limits? Did we cease to throw shells into 
Vicksburg or Atlanta because women and children were there?”120 
 
This is all firmly in line with Valentino and Ulfelder’s findings that during wars 
against counterinsurgency, the chance of mass killing, and the targeting of 
noncombatants in particular, is greatly increased. Even Dee Brown, who places the 
events of Washita firmly in the area of massacre, makes the point that the non-
combatants were killed when the effort to separate warriors from old men, women, and 
children was too “slow and dangerous for the cavalrymen.”121 The battle also differs from 
Sand Creek in key ways. A high number of non-combatants were kept as prisoners of 
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war, and often for the express purpose of dissuading violence.122 While the practice of 
using women and children as attack dissuading human shields is morally suspect, the 
intention in this case was not to expressly exterminate the non-combatants, nor to use 
them in combat. Custer’s goal was to prevent military conflict with opponents who were, 
at that moment, superior in combat and numbers, and in general far better equipped to 
engage in a prolonged and protracted conflict on the boundless expanse of the Great 
Plains.  
This intention is corroborated by Custer in his memoirs, where he expressed that 
he was numerically unequipped to engage with the Southern Cheyenne, and chose instead 
to adopt “proper precautions” so that the “Indians would not molest” his troops.123  
“Indians contemplating a battle, either offensive or defensive, are always anxious 
to have their women and children removed from all danger thereof. By our watchfulness 
we intended to let the Indians see that there would be no opportunity for them to take us 
by surprise, but that if fighting was intended, it should not all be on one side. For this 
reason I decided to locate our camp as close as convenient to the village, knowing that 
the close proximity of their women and children, and their necessary exposure in case of 
conflict, would operate as a powerful argument in favor of peace, when the question of 
peace or war came to be discussed.”124 
 
By keeping the hostages within the troops, Custer sought to effectively ward off 
counter attack.125 This strategically minded viewpoint is not at odds with the virulent 
racism that accompanied any campaign against indigenous people, but it does present 
evidence that suggests that the Washita massacre falls more in line with a strategy of war 
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than an ideological effort to exterminate a specific group of people. Less present were 
Sémelin or Kiernan’s theories of racial superiority. Custer was no fool, he knew that the 
Cheyenne had military superiority, both in numbers and strategy. His actions were based 
on this understanding of Cheyenne superiority, not an active denial of it. There was also 
little push for the destruction of a contaminant or impurity, nor a clear emphasis on 
antiquity or agrarianism, which shows little evidence for important tenets of both Sémelin 
and Kiernan’s theories. Sémelin’s emphasis on threat and security, however, is present, 
and informs the desire to attack the Cheyenne. This emphasis does not explain the killing 
of noncombatants as effectively as Valentino et al.’s research on counterinsurgency does, 
however.  
Furthermore, it was the military officers who lived and fought in the territories 
who tended towards more violent response to the “Indian problem.” On the ground 
officers and generals were given a greater say during the Chicago meeting, and pushed 
militarized solutions. This suggests that officers familiar with the insurgency tactics 
common on the Great Plains were pushing tactical agenda, and that national desires had 
less strength in controlling military action at the time. National actors, of course, did not 
have as much influence or control over military officers in the territories. 
A final important element to note when addressing non-combatant casualties on 
the plains is the difference in winter military capacities between the Confederate States 
and the Plains Indians. While the winter campaigns in the south were effective, they were 
also directed against an enemy who knew its family was safe at home and could fight 
effectively in both the winter and the summer. Plains Indian soldiers traditionally did not 
fight in the winter because they wintered with their families and other non-combatants, 
43 
 
and relied on grazing for their horses, rather than supply lines and grains.126 Thus, while 
the outcome of this winter campaign did not include any decisive battles and may have 
been more oriented towards the defeat of an enemy considered to be using insurgency 
tactics, the campaign remained psychologically and economically devastating for the 
Southern Cheyenne and their allies.127  
 
Marias River – 1870 
One massacre which seems to garner less attention by histories than many of the 
others presented here is the Piegan Blackfeet massacre at the bend of the Marias River. 
The massacre has roots in an event far more innocuous, a dispute between a Pikuni man, 
Owl Child, and a white settler, Malcom Clarke. In brief, horses were stolen, names were 
called, Owl Child was beaten and publicly humiliated, and Clarke was killed in revenge. 
The settlers were furious, beseeching the United States to come and protect them from 
Indian depredations. The army, however, did not immediately respond with military 
action. Instead they sent General Sully to meet with four peace chiefs of the Blackfeet 
Nation and received their assurance that Owl Child, who was an outcast among most 
Blackfeet bands and wintered with Mountain Chief, would be given up to the United 
States as soon as possible.128   
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When the timeframe given to the chiefs to turn over Owl Child came and passed, 
Gen. Sheridan outfitted four companies of cavalry and sent Colonel Baker north.129 Gen. 
Sheridan again chose a winter campaign, knowing the effectiveness of these campaigns 
against indigenous foes. His orders to Col. Baker were, “If the lives and property of the 
citizens of Montana can best be protected by striking Mountain Chief’s band, I want them 
struck. Tell Baker to strike them hard.”130 Baker’s orders, however, applied only to 
Mountain Chief’s band, and Gen. Sully had given the other chiefs papers of safe conduct 
for their movements and wintering in the Montana territory.131 To this end, a half-Pikuni 
scout known as Raven Quiver traveled with Col. Baker to ensure the mission went 
smoothly.132   
When Baker arrived at what he believed to be Mountain Chief’s camp he 
surrounded it and prepared to attack at dawn. Upon seeing the painted designs on the 
buffalo skin lodges, Raven Quiver realized the camp was, in fact, Heavy Runner’s winter 
camp, and went immediately to Baker to inform him that it was the wrong camp. Baker 
replied, “That makes no difference, one band or another of them; they are all Piegans 
[Pikunis] and we will attack them.”133 The resulting attack left 173 dead, almost entirely 
women and children.  
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The attitude of the settlers in the territory was similar to their attitude toward the 
other massacres so far examined. Newspapers endorsed the actions of Baker and argued 
that the massacre would provide “future peace and security.”134 Similar to the reactions to 
Chivington after Sand Creek, many frontier newspapers saw the act as punishment for 
“nameless mutilations” and “atrocities.”135 Back east, however, the attitude was one of 
horror and shame. Congressmen were quick to condemn the violence stating “[This 
system of warfare] cannot be justified here or before the country; it cannot be justified 
before the civilization of the age, or in the sight of God or man” and “... there is no 
warrant in the laws of God or of man for destroying women and children merely because 
their husbands and fathers may be marauders. I say that civilization shudders at horrors 
like this.”136 The Chicago Tribune joined the cry saying “there is nothing in the records of 
the Indian Office which surpasses the atrocities detailed in this paper.”137 The events at 
Sand Creek seemed to have effectively faded from mind. One congressman, who may 
have stood alone, supported Baker’s actions, and called for a war of extermination.138  
Despite this outcry, Gen. Sheridan and Col. Baker managed to avoid punishment. 
Gen. Sheridan was close to Gen. Sherman, and wrote to him with vivid descriptions of 
rapes and “scalped and mutilated” corpses by the hundreds, which he could not give 
names to out of “delicacy.”139 Sherman passed the buck to the Interior Department, and 
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the U.S. Army’s internal investigation found Sheridan and Baker innocent.140 This did 
prompt extreme reform of the Indian Bureau, however, which came to be known as 
“Grant’s Peace Policy,” the goal of which was to put more Quakers and religious groups 
in charge of Indian policy. 
This massacre provides some evidence for Sémelin and Kiernan’s theses 
regarding racial superiority. Col. Baker chose to engage in the attack because “they are 
all Piegans,” though his orders were clear that attacking Heavy Runner’s camp was not 
his task. He argued that his actions conformed to national orders, and that he was not 
acting out of a fear of security or impurity. Security fears, however, explicitly drove the 
sentiments of the settlers who demanded his actions. On multiple subnational levels, 
security and racial fears contributed to Col. Baker’s actions on the Marias River. On more 
national levels, the instructions to attack Mountain Chief at his winter camp were born 
out of realistic understandings of defeating an enemy that relied on insurgency tactics, in 
addition to settler driven security fears. Mountain Chief’s camp, however, was not 
attacked. Col. Baker’s personal actions were born out of racism. The resulting massacre 
was clearly more in line with an ideological desire to exterminate an enemy, and not in 
line with efforts to protect against counterinsurgency. This was true regardless of Gen. 
Sheridan’s attempts to defend Col. Baker using the logic of counterinsurgency. 
This massacre also elucidates the subnational and national divide in dealing with 
military conflicts. Multiple generals worked more and less effectively to ensure the safety 
of bands deemed “non-hostile,” using papers of safe conduct and scouts who were 
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familiar with the cultures targeted. Further, the army represented both sides of the 
subnational/national divide. There was Baker acting on personal, rather than superior, 
orders, and attacking a camp that he was told was friendly. Then his actions were backed 
by national actors such as Sheridan and Sherman. Regardless, national policy again 
sought to avoid situations like this in the future through Grant’s peace policy.141  
  
Wounded Knee - 1890 
When we get warning from heaven; 
Then the angels will come; 
Then the wonderful bells will ring; 
Then our souls will be ready; 
Then they will go up to heaven; 
Then we will sing with Jesus; 
Then we will be happy with Jesus. 
Song of Heaven142 
 
“You must not fight. Do no harm to anyone. Do right always.” 
- Wovoka143 
 
 In some ways, the 1890 Wounded Knee Massacre is a surprising choice for an 
official “end” to the Plains Indian Wars. Independent indigenous sovereignty over any 
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part of the Great Plains officially ended in 1877, shortly after Crazy Horse’s surrender. 
This marked the end of the Great Sioux War, when the United States used the Agreement 
of 1877 to annex the last remaining Sioux lands and establish a smaller, non-independent 
Sioux reservation.144 1877 also marked the end to organized military resistance by the 
Sioux. Still, the Wounded Knee massacre is seen as the conclusive end of indigenous 
resistance towards U.S. sovereignty over the Great Plains.145 The event marked a violent 
end to the ongoing military conflicts between the two nations, despite occurring thirteen 
years after the end of official Sioux military engagement. Because of this violent end, the 
Wounded Knee Massacre remains a powerful and lasting image in the history of the 
genocide of indigenous people in the United States. 
Just prior to the Wounded Knee massacre, many indigenous communities, 
particularly on the Great Plains, had taken strongly to a syncretic Christian religious 
movement. The movement, led by a Paiute man named Wovoka, promised the 
disappearance of the whites, and the subsequent end to white rule, through nonviolent 
resistance and a spiritual dance referred to by white settlers as “the Ghost Dance.” The 
Ghost Dance was particularly popular among the Sioux, no doubt due to the relatively 
recent loss of independence over their lands. As the Ghost Dance spread throughout the 
Sioux reservations “almost all other activities came to a halt.”146 
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 “No pupils appeared at the schoolhouses, the trading stores were empty, no work was 
done on the little farms. At Pine Ridge the frightened agent telegraphed Washington: 
‘Indians are dancing in the snow and are wild and crazy. . . . We need protection and we 
need it now. The leaders should be arrested and confined at some military outpost until 
the matter is quieted, and this should be done at once.”147 
 
 While involved only by implicit acceptance, Sitting Bull was named as a 
“fomenter of disturbance” by agents in the field.148 Assumed to be actively fostering 
discontent by the Indian Bureau, Sitting Bull was arrested at the Standing Rock 
Reservation. Though he went with Reservation Police willingly, Ghost Dancers protested 
and resisted his arrest at his house. This prompted a confrontation in which Sitting Bull 
was killed.149 Out of fear of reprisal, hundreds of leaderless Hunkpapa Sioux fled from 
Standing Rock, seeking refuge elsewhere. Some arrived at the camp of Spotted Elk (also 
known as Big Foot). Spotted Elk was also on the list of “fomenters of disturbances” and 
had been ordered to be arrested. Spotted Elk decided to move his band of Minneconjou 
with the Hunkpapa who had arrived, to the Pine Ridge Reservation. He hoped that Red 
Cloud might protect him from an end similar to Sitting Bull’s.150  
As they moved west, Spotted Elk’s band was met by four columns of U.S. 
cavalry, and was escorted by this cavalry for five miles to Wounded Knee Creek. Spotted 
Elk’s band slept under the scope of not only the soldiers and their weapons, but four 
Hotchkiss guns,151 which were set up on the slope above them. The following morning 
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the soldiers surrounded the Minneconjou camp, and demanded all weapons be turned 
over. After issuing breakfast hardtack and disarming Spotted Elk’s band, the soldiers 
“were not satisfied with the number of weapons surrendered and… searched the tents.”152 
They found only two additional guns, one of which was owned by a young, deaf 
Minneconjou named Black Coyote. Black Coyote had bought the gun and either 
misunderstood the intent of the soldiers or resisted giving up his Winchester rifle. It is 
unclear who fired the first shot, but the response was a swift and destructive attack by the 
U.S. forces using their rifles and machine guns against the unarmed Minneconjou. 
Between 150 and 300 of the 350 Minneconjou and Hunkpapa who were gathered with 
Spotted Elk were killed. Twenty-five soldiers were killed, and thirty-nine wounded, 
although many of these are estimated to have been struck by friendly fire.153  
There is hardly a unified explanation as to why the massacre occurred, although it 
seems unlikely that the massacre was “a regrettable, tragic accident of war… for which 
neither side as a whole may be properly condemned” as expressed by authors such as 
Robert Utley.154 Most pressingly, the United States and the Sioux nation155 were not at 
war. It is also unlikely that a band made up mostly of women and children, led by a very 
sick chief, would engage in a pitched battle with no weapons in the center of their camp, 
in the middle of winter. It is equally unlikely they would choose to simply ignore the 
soldiers’ superiority of arms and four light machine guns aimed towards the lodges. 
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The fact that the United States and the Sioux nation were not at war makes the 
hypothesis that this was a violent tactical response to counterinsurgency unlikely. That 
said, there was a clear fear that the Ghost Dance would encourage the Sioux nation to rise 
up, which historically had meant guerilla attacks on both civilian and military outposts 
throughout the west. Newspapers as far away as New York were reporting on the Ghost 
Dance as an Indian practice to “work themselves up to fighting pitch” (Cite B). They 
were allegedly “armed with Winchesters and side arms” and “well supplied with 
ammunition.”156 General Brooke informed the War Department that a body of “300 
Rosebud warriors” had appeared “as if they had risen out of the earth,” all armed with 
“Winchesters and plenty of ammunition.”157 Rumors circulated that settlers in North 
Dakota were “abandoning their ranches and farms” out of fear, “Indians were armed with 
‘Custer’s rifles, which had never been found,’” and “local hardware men had sold out all 
their ammunition to the Indians.”158 In reality, there were no efforts by the Sioux to 
prepare any number of soldiers for combat. Given the historic difficulty of indigenous 
resisters to procure ammunition at the best of times when they were able to freely trade 
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for and buy ammunition from traders across the Great Plains, it is also unlikely that they 
were well supplied with weapons and a great deal of ammunition. 
Of course, the newspapers contributed not only to a sense of fear and 
intimidation, but also to a general disgust for Sioux people. One report stated that the 
dance they saw incited the consumption of raw meat, hallucination, and cannibalism: 
 “They kill several steers and eat them raw, drink and gorge themselves to make 
up for their fast. At last Friday’s dance one of the braves was to go into a trance and 
remain in this condition four days. At the close of this period he was to come to life as a 
buffalo- he would still have the form of a man, but he would be a buffalo. They were then 
to kill the buffalo, and every Indian who did not eat a piece of him would become a dog. 
The man who was turned into a buffalo was perfectly willing, and I suppose they have 
killed and eaten him by this time.”159 
 
To be clear, the Ghost Dance was not a preparation of war or an effort to incite 
rebellion or violence. Indeed, the very basis of the movement centered around the 
Christian faith, with Wovoka encouraging Native Americans to profess their faith in the 
Christian God, farm, and send their children to school.160 This, like earlier events against 
the Cherokee, encourages a critical look at Kiernan’s thesis that the agrarian romance was 
key to the racism and violence perpetrated against indigenous people in the United States. 
The cause of the massacre seems to be far more connected to a fear of renewed 
insurgency and racism centered around threatening and impure indigenous people. The 
allegation that raw meat was being consumed and cannibalism was occurring seems to 
reinforce the fear of impurity and inhumanity, while the fear of another uprising put the 
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United States on edge. Again, this seems to support Sémelin’s thesis as a more effective 
way to theorize genocide. 
Except in the ways that the massacre falls in line with fears of security, it does not 
support Valentino et al’s counterinsurgency reasoning. Still, the fear of an insurgency 
appearing again did drive the actions by the military. This suggests that security fears and 
the threat of counterinsurgency may be closely linked, and may provide reasoning to 
commit violence even in the absence of an actual insurgency, although Valentino et al’s 
research suggests this is unlikely.  
In the 1870s, the nation, led by President Grant, adopted a “peace policy.” While 
this policy was not entirely effective at preventing either violence or genocidal practices, 
it was further intent by the U.S. government to avoid mass killings. In short, Chivington, 
Sheridan, Miles, and their ilk, failed to successfully convince the nation to engage in the 
“extermination policy.” This gives strength to the theory that the violence that occurred at 
Wounded Knee was a response to the perceived threat of war, as opposed to 
extermination oriented ideology. This also supports Sémelin’s thesis that fear and 
insecurity play a larger part than racism by itself can explain. 
The Wounded Knee Massacre reveals the power of national ideology in times of 
genocide. Wounded Knee, like the other massacres on the Great Plains, did not take place 
on a reservation. It did, however, take place with Sioux people moving from one 
reservation to the other, and so is the only massacre which is related to the reservation 
system. This is important because it relates directly to the idea that the United States was 
attempting to end a military conflict with an insurgency oriented enemy, and not to use 
military means to exterminate this enemy. If they had been extermination oriented due to 
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ideology and policy, we would expect to see more examples of military violence on the 
reservations. The reservations were the only place the military could effectively end the 
superior mobility of the Plains Indians peoples, and thereby keep them in one place. 
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CHAPTER III 
GENOCIDE BY ANY OTHER MEANS 
“She asked, ‘your hair’s really pretty, what are you?’ 
And I said, ‘thank you. I’m Lakota, I’m Native American.’ 
She looked at me confused, and she said, ‘aren’t you guys extinct?’” 
- Frank Waln161  
 
While this thesis seeks to examine mass killings, as they tend to be the focus of 
modern theories of genocide, the relative uncommonness of mass killings on the Great 
Plains compared to other genocides creates a sort of paradox. Given that genocide 
occurred on the plains, and that genocide is primarily theorized using mass killings, and 
that over virtually the entire period within which the massacres take place the national 
government was not committed to an extermination policy, how was the genocide carried 
out? On the plains, most deaths were caused by the destruction of livelihood and 
agriculture, withholding of resources by corruption in the Indian Bureau, and the forced 
theft of children who were sent to boarding schools. 
 
Economic Devastation and the Extermination of the Buffalo 
First, lets us examine the economic devastation. It is important to recognize the 
importance of the buffalo to Plains Indian cultures, but in terms of livelihood and civil 
health, it is perhaps more important to recognize how their economies centered around 
the buffalo. While deer and elk could provide food, shelter, and clothing for Plains 
nations, they were neither sufficient nor efficient enough to truly provide for the many 
peoples that were living on the Great Plains at the time. The population of the plains was 
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able to survive thanks to the expansive buffalo herds that roamed the west before white 
settlement. Singular buffalo could provide as much meet as eight deer or five elk, so 
when the buffalo were scarce hunters were forced to be in the field constantly.162 When it 
came to Americans, the goal of killing buffalo varied in both intent and effort. Sheridan 
and Sherman understood exterminating the buffalo as a way to push Indians to the 
reservations, and end their hunter-gatherer livelihoods.163 Furthermore, on the part of 
both officers and Indian allies, the destruction of the buffalo signaled the destruction of 
the Sioux. Rooster points out a quote by reporter John F. Finerty who said that when 
reproached for wanton buffalo slaughter, Indian allies replied “better kill buffalo than 
have him feed the Sioux.”164   
Still, the extent to which the military sought the extermination of the buffalo as a 
policy is unclear. There are examples of concerted efforts by the military to kill the 
buffalo, such as Lieutenant Colonel Bradley being commanded “to kill all the buffalo we 
find, & drive the Arappahoes [sic] & Cheyennes south, & the Sioux north.”165 There was 
also military encouragement of hunters killing the buffalo, such as Lieutenant Colonel 
Dodge pushing them to “Kill every buffalo you can! Every buffalo dead is an Indian 
gone.”166 Still others provide examples of officers protesting the slaughter, and even 
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Sheridan authorized an effort “to put a stop to their wholesale destruction.”167 This 
reflected a situation where the killing of buffalo was accepted, but “few senior officers 
openly expressed a desire to use armed forces to exterminate the buffalo” and “several 
officers formally protested the wanton destruction of these animals.”168 
The true devastation occurred when a new method of industrial tanning was 
developed in the south in 1871, and a host of hunters fell upon the plains, killing and 
skinning every buffalo they could find in order to sell the hides. Contrary to popular 
belief, it seems that economic incentive on the part of private individuals provided the 
impetus to destroy the great herds of buffalo on the plains, albeit with encouragement, 
and often a great deal of free ammunition, from the military.169 This destruction of the 
buffalo would devastate the Plains Indian economies, and push them, by threat of 
starvation, to the reservations. This violence seems to be motivated almost entirely by 
greed and pragmatic decisions to undermine indigenous power, and does not fit neatly 
into any of the theories mentioned so far. 
 
Corruption and the Reservation System 
The other side of this, of course, was the situation for plains bands that chose to 
abandon the nomadic lifestyle and submit to the authority, and often the will and whim, 
of Indian agents. Even frontier newspapers were quick to condemn the Indian Bureau and 
its agents for corruption, arguing that withholding federally appointed rations to 
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reservation Indians was one of the primary reasons that uprisings and depredations 
occurred.170 The main motivation for withholding annuities was to sell the provisions 
granted by annuities at drastically increased prices, such that a substantial portion of the 
annuities would be claimed by traders and agents.171 The starvation resulting from 
withholding federally given food is blamed for several uprisings and “outbreaks,” as well 
as preventing “free” Indians from settling on the reservations.172 In particular, the 
withholding of food by Indian agents is seen as the primary cause of the Great Sioux 
Uprising in 1862 which resulted in the deaths of 350 white settlers, as well as 100 
soldiers. Indeed, while this wasn’t the express policy of the U.S. government, the implicit 
acceptance of the ordeal by the U.S. government, as opposed to condemnation, gives 
credit to the idea that national actors accepted this behavior. 
 
Religion Preventing Mass Killings 
Interestingly, there seems to be, in this case, some strong evidence for Michael 
Mann’s conclusion that “Christianity strengthened dispossession but weakened 
murderous cleansing.”173 This deserves exploration because of the intuitive connection 
between religious ideology and violence, least of which might be the murderous 
Methodist Chivington. Despite his example, religious ideology generally seems to have 
been a force for the prevention of mass killings. It is clear, however, that it was not above 
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promoting the destruction of nativeness, and a primary drive for the forced theft of native 
children and the destruction of hunter gatherer lifestyles.  
In a sermon in Cleveland in 1854, Joseph Baughner Bittinger makes this 
exceedingly clear when he preaches against hunting freed slaves. He asked the gathered 
congregation if they wish to see the “stipulated hunting ground of the Indian become the 
constitutional hunting ground of the slave power. [Will the] savage red man and the 
grizzly bear... make room for the more savage white man and his human prey?”174 That 
he might imply whites being more savage than Native Americans is interesting, but the 
more important part is that action defines savageness. The idea that one can become more 
or less savage through actions is often demonstrated by the idea that indigenous people 
could lose their ‘Indianness’ through reeducation and farm work. 
Another common theme in religious texts and sermons was the unity of 
humankind, and the possibility of all races to become “civilized.” In his collection of 
sermons, Eli Meeker makes many of the underlying racial prejudices of his time clear, 
speaking about Africans as having a “silly and idiotick [sic] countenance,” while 
describing “some of the Europeans and the Americans in the United States” as cultivating 
“arts and sciences” to their “greatest perfection.”175 Still, Meeker’s thesis is that despite 
the clear differences in physiology, humans are all one species, separated not by nature, 
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but by “climate.”176 He therefore establishes that all humans are brethren, and should 
“enjoy the same blessings” and “privileges.”177  
This view is furthered in the religious response to the actions taken against the 
Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and others in the southeast. Before the “Trail of Tears” 
the Cherokee had built a capital, with schools, churches, a newspaper (the bilingual 
Cherokee Phoenix), and a constitutionally based representative republic with a Supreme 
Court. The irony of their displacement was not lost to later writers, even in the 19th 
century, as shown by Rev. John Tighe’s essay The Indian Question, in which he notes the 
repetitive breaking of government treaties and mistreatment of native peoples throughout 
U.S. history.178 His solution, like many religious men of his time, was religious 
education, with Catholicism as his particular answer. He ridiculed and condemned, 
however, the belief that extermination is the answer. He argued that those who believe 
“[Indians are] unsusceptible of civilized influences” forget the violence of the United 
States in the past and the “successes” of the Catholic Church in Latin America and 
Canada.179 In effect, these religious views strongly contributed to the “civilizing” method 
of Indian policy, and the devastation that was caused by it. At the same time, they 
discouraged extermination or mass killing.  
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One religious group that effectively avoided mass killing and genocide by other 
means was the Quakers. The Quakers were long seen, and saw themselves, as protectors 
of indigenous Americans. In 1827, an article was printed in The friend, a religious journal 
of the Quakers, which condemned the violence of the federal government, and recounted 
their own fair dealings with native peoples in Pennsylvania: 
“Not a single act of oppression or cruelty is found chargeable to our forefathers.” “That 
so long as our religious Society exercised control in the government, or influence in its 
councils, so long was the soil of Pennsylvania free from the stain of Indian blood.”180 
 
 As a general rule, religion seems to encourage people to adopt a stance that leans 
away from massacre, although not away from lethal genocidal action, as shown by the 
next section. 
High Lethality Boarding Schools 
Despite Quaker efforts, this emphasis on “civilizing” led to the most devastating 
of the genocidal tactics enacted by the federal government, the boarding school system. 
Simply put, the boarding schools were a system of coerced assimilation involving 
physical abuse, starvation, and disease. While average Americans often approach this part 
of U.S. history with mild remorse or reproach, Ward Churchill’s exploration of the 
subject provides a more damning explanation of the situation: 
 “Mortality rates in the schools were appalling from the outset. … Duncan 
Campbell Scott181 observed that, in Canada, ‘fifty percent of the children who passed 
through these schools did not live to benefit from the education they received therein’. To 
place this startling proportion in proper perspective, it should be borne in mind that the 
death rate at the infamous Nazi concentration camp of Dachau was 36 per cent, mostly 
from disease. At Buchenwald, another notorious example, the rate was 19 per cent. At 
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Mauthausen, described by historian Michael Burleigh as exhibiting ‘the harshest regime 
of all concentration camps,’ the death rate was 58 per cent (again, mostly from 
malnutrition and attendant disease). What is known from the U.S. experience suggests 
that conditions and outcomes there were, at best, only marginally better than those 
pertaining under Scott’s regime in the north.’”182 
 
Churchill further points out that even a BIA inspector, William McConnell, “was 
openly denouncing the whole residential education system as embodying a policy of 
deliberate slaughter.”183 The United States was pursuing a policy of forcibly transferring 
children of one group to another group,184 causing serious bodily or mental harm to these 
children,185 and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about their physical destruction in whole or in part.186   
Clearly, both the reservation system, and the boarding school system, were seen 
as ways to separate and purify a cultural group which was seen as a dangerous out-group 
on the plains. Newspapers across the U.S. were comfortable painting native people as 
savages, and the only outcry occurred during moments of brutal massacre, not during day 
to day subjugation of indigenous populations. Sémelin’s hypothesis that security and 
purity threat are evident here, as the United States sought to subdue, contain, and 
assimilate the peoples of the plains. This assimilation became starvation and mass murder 
by disease in the boarding schools, even though these were not forgone conclusions. The 
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reservation system also presents some of the only explicit evidence supporting Kiernan’s 
theory, where a primary desire in the reservation ideology was to convert indigenous 
people to farmers. The buffalo are simpler to place because they represented a 
straightforward way to implement Sherman’s scorched earth policies. That said, they 
were only exterminated when their deaths were profitable to private enterprise, not as a 
course of policy. Therefore, they don’t fit particularly well in the presented theories 
because their destruction wasn’t a deliberate course of action. The desire to exterminate 
them fits more neatly into efforts to end an insurgency through destruction of the 
insurgent’s base of support, and do little to support Sémelin or Kiernan’s theses directly. 
The action of exterminating them, and the resulting effects on indigenous power, were a 
byproduct of individual greed, not genocidal or militaristic ideology. 
In short, economic devastation and starvation drove Plains communities to the 
reservations, where they were often preyed upon by corrupt agents, prompting rebellions 
which were met with military violence. After the armed conflicts ended, native children 
were stolen and subjected to high mortality conditions, which denied their impending 
rights to family, health, safety, and culture.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
“Let me go. You’ve gotten me hurt.” 
- Crazy Horse187 
 
“A tragedy has taken place on our land, and even though it did not take place on our 
watch, we are its inheritors, and the earth remembers.” 
- Kent Nerburn188 
What does the study of the Plains Indian Wars in this context reveal? First, the 
threat, real or imagined, of “Indian depredations,” and the common view of white 
superiority and indigenous savagery, contributed vastly to settler and the white 
government’s thinking on how to deal with the “Indian problem.” These fears were 
present whether the “Indian problem” was in the form of the military conflicts or the 
imagined threat of racial mixture or interaction between white settlers and indigenous 
nations.  
In simplistic terms, Table 1 and Table 2 represent the connections between 
massacres and genocidal tactics perpetrated by the United States and the theories 
examined in this thesis. The Sand Creek Massacre, and the Marias Massacre, demonstrate 
that fears of identity, purity, and especially insecurity, had the capacity to drive white 
settlers to extreme acts of violence, strongly supporting Sémelin’s thesis. The Wounded 
Knee Massacre seems to provide the best evidence for Sémelin’s thesis, with the strong 
purity components presenting themselves in articles about cannibalism and in the 
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syncretism present in the Ghost Dance movement. That said, when compared to other 
genocides which inform theory that seeks to explain mass killing, the number of 
Table 1 
Driver     
 Sand 
Creek 
Washita Marias Wounded 
Knee 
Identity/Racism Yes No Yes Yes 
Purity No189 No No Yes190 
Security Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cult of Antiquity No No No No 
Agrarian Romance No No No No 
Counterinsurgency 
Tactics 
No Yes No To Some 
Extent 
     
Most Appropriate 
Explanation 
Sémelin Sémelin & 
Counterinsurgency 
Sémelin & 
Counterinsurgency 
Sémelin 
 
Table 2 
 Buffalo Reservations Boarding Schools 
Identity/Racism No Yes “Kill the Indian” 
(Yes) 
Purity No Yes No 
Security Yes Yes No 
Cult of Antiquity No No No (Quite the 
opposite) 
Agrarian Romance191 No Yes  
Counterinsurgency Tactics No Yes No 
    
Most Appropriate 
Explanation 
Counterinsurgency Sémelin Sémelin 
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massacres on the Great Plains remains few, though the majority seem to have been driven 
by Sémelin’s anxieties. This chart makes it appear that purity was not a significant driver 
of genocide on the Plains. While it is rarely expressed explicitly as a fear of impurity, it 
would seem that the subtext of much of the identity and racial fears seem to support fears 
of purity as underlying dehumanization and racism. 
Still, even when the primary drive seems to be hatred or fear, the secondary drive 
of using strong offensive power to defeat an enemy adept at guerrilla warfare and 
avoiding direct battle is still present at Sand Creek and Wounded Knee. Indeed, Washita, 
Marias, and Gen. Crook’s attacks on the Apache all demonstrate military willingness to 
make concerted efforts to go on the offensive and push hard, even through the night, to 
catch up with indigenous “foes.” Due to the military successes from aggressive 
offensiveness, the military felt this strategy was necessary to defeat indigenous militaries 
in battle.192 This information supports Valentino and Ulfelder’s data suggesting that in 
some conflicts counterinsurgency tactics encourage the use of targeting non-combatants 
because of the difficulty in separating combatants and noncombatants. Indeed, the lack of 
massacre on any reservation, with the contextual exception of Wounded Knee, suggests 
that extermination was used only when the fear of an “Indian attack” or “Indian war” 
existed. An “Indian war” meant guerilla attacks on outposts, towns, and wagon trains. 
This certainly encouraged some soldiers to adopt a counterinsurgency method when 
dealing with indigenous peoples in general. This suggests that noncombatant targeting 
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counterinsurgency tactics may be linked to Sémelin’s fears of insecurity, as was 
demonstrated repeatedly here. 
Of course, this relies on the idea that policy insisted on forced march, offensive 
maneuvers. In reality, there are plenty of moments where the U.S. army held back, or 
moved slowly, or did not push the offensive. Such was the case during Chief Joseph’s 
flight north with his band of Nez Perce. Whether due to poor discipline, slow lines of 
communication, lack of consistent policy, or design there remained sub national decision 
making within the U.S. military during this time period, as subordinates were given a 
great deal of leeway in decision making.193 These subnational actors controlling military 
action were, of course, very clear in instances such as Sand Creek or the Marias River. 
They were also of paramount importance during the campaigns that were focused on 
counterinsurgency, however, which could fail or succeed based on an officer’s 
willingness to pursue an offensive and direct strategy. 
It is also evident that there is a clear difference between the strategic desires of 
national and subnational actors during this period. National actors, such as Grant and 
Lincoln, wanted to “solve the Indian problem” by avoiding massacre and mass killing. 
Their alternative was, of course, the boarding school and reservation system, where the 
goal was to “kill the Indian, save the man.” This was clearly at odds with many people on 
the ground in the territories, as demonstrated by the “killing Indians deserves praise” 
attitude in the territories and Chivington’s murderous Thirdsters. This also helps explain 
why the massacre at Sand Creek is so dissimilar to other massacres on the Great Plains, 
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and why it may not be dissimilar if compared to massacres during wars or conflicts 
between the United States and other indigenous nations outside of the Great Plains. 
It is important to realize that the United States has not always pursued a strategy 
of immediate condemnation of militia led massacre. Take, for example, Vietnam, 
massacres of indigenous Californians, and Wounded Knee.194 Therefore, the historical 
record suggests that the prevalence of massacre and mass killings by military or militia 
forces are directly linked to the will of national actors, particularly when national actors 
have the force to impose their will on either the military or militia volunteer actors.  
The chart shows that there was also little evidence supporting Kiernan’s thesis 
that cults of antiquity and agrarianism were integral to the genocidal enterprise. There 
does seem to be strong evidence that Kiernan’s examples informed the ethnic conflict, 
however, as agrarianism as an ideal was a basis of policy from the national perspective. 
The other side of this was that agrarianism, when embraced, failed to protect indigenous 
people. As a final note, Kiernan’s thesis might lead us to believe that the most fervent 
exterminationists would be urban editorialists celebrating agrarian romanticism, however 
this proved to be false in regards to the Plains Indian Wars. Urban writers tended to be far 
more horrified than their contemporaries in the territories. 
Valentino et al. might offer an explanation as to why the territorial officers tended 
towards exterminationism, and the federal government tended towards “peace policy.” 
Because the Plains Indians were a threat to territory governments, and not the 
government in the East, the insurgency was taken less seriously, and therefore tactically 
                                                     
194 Scott, Peter Dale, “Atrocity and Its Discontents: US Double-mindedness about Massacre, from the 
Plains Wars to Indonesia” in Genocide, War Crimes, and the West (New York : Room 400, 2004), pp 146-
163. 
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targeting non-combatants was not seen as necessary to the federal government. If the 
Sioux had managed an attack on Boston or New York it might have signaled to the East 
that they had the power to endanger the federal government, and the national government 
may have been more ready to embrace exterminationist policies.  
Thus, two conclusions can be made. First, Sémelin’s theory that fears founded on 
identity, purity, and security lead to mass killings seems to be inadequate given the 
relative lack of mass killing. It is clear, however, that these very fears seemed to support 
much of the genocidal strategies, regardless of whether they included mass killing. 
Identity, purity, and security came up repeated throughout the time period as 
justifications to attack, subdue, and contain indigenous people. In a similar fashion, 
Valentino and Ulfelder help explain the remaining massacres that occurred. This may or 
may not encourage an effort to distinguish mass killing that occurs as counterinsurgency, 
and mass killing that occurs as the result of ideological strategies of war, especially since 
these explanations seem to inform each other on the plains. 
Second, U.S. military strategy and the difference between national and 
subnational desires suggest that the U.S. military during this period occupied an 
interesting space as both a national and subnational actor. By virtue of being the U.S. 
military, the military acted as an agent of national strategy, however poor communication 
forced the War Department to rely on volunteers and the choices of individual officers. 
The reliance on volunteer soldiers and individual officers, especially during the Civil 
War, served to give a great deal of power to subnational sentiment and individual desires, 
where less leeway would be given to a more disciplined and centralized fighting force. 
This naturally suggests that the agenda of national actors is a key force in genocide, and 
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the extent to which they exert influence on the periphery is directly linked to whether 
their desires become manifest. As demonstrated here, subnational actors and national 
actors may share feelings towards the targeted group, but if their strategies of, in this case 
genocide, differ, it is the national actors who are likely to succeed in getting their 
strategies implemented. Intuitively, national actors have the legitimate backing of the 
military and legislative force. 
 
Future Research 
 This thesis, in many ways, raises more questions than it answers. For example, 
massacre on the Great Plains is not necessarily an ideal or explanatory way to deal with 
the loss of life and culture on the Great Plains, however it may fit other areas of U.S. 
expansion, particularly in California, Oregon, and the area East of the Mississippi. 
Cursory research suggests that these areas had higher incidents of ideologically driven 
massacre, particularly in early colonial America, however a comparative study would be 
necessary. The reason this is important is that the historic relative lack of mass killing as 
a strategy on the Great Plains does not suggest that extensive massacre was an 
impossibility. In fact, the push by both parts of military and civilian society for 
extermination makes a case for the possibility of this exact occurrence. Why then, did it 
occur about once every six years. This is relatively rare when considering other incidents 
of mass killing. 
 Additionally, the possibility that sub nationally driven massacre was more 
common in California deserves attention because of the greater distance between 
California and the federal government. Perhaps reduced national influence might explain 
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a difference in tactics, if other studies also find that national ideology and power may be 
the primary difference between genocidal violence and other forms of mass violence. An 
alternative explanation for the relative lack of massacre on the plains might be the 
aggrandizement of Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull, Red Cloud, etc., as ‘noble savages.’ Their 
fame may have allowed for the horror back east, where other tribes may not have had 
such an advantage.195  
 Finally, an exploration of the question of whether the distinction between 
ideological massacre and counterinsurgency related massacre is worthwhile. While the 
goal of counterinsurgency related massacre is to wipe out a community, in whole or in 
part, and can therefore clearly be a tactic of genocide, it is often not as based in a 
worldview of extermination based on race or ethnicity (as shown by some of Custer’s 
thought processes), but rather in the logic of war. Still, the question may be of little use, 
considering the end result of mass killing of a specific targeted group of people being the 
same. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 I believe this research compels one to think of genocide from a holistic sense, 
rather than from a view of preventing mass killings. This attempt to include the rhetorical 
and social can be seen as undesirable because mass killing is, for the layperson and the 
genocide preventer, easily defined and clearly morally abject, while other forms of 
violence are often relegated to the category of unfortunate but less extreme. My hope is 
                                                     
195 Wooster points to their “large numbers” and “growing mystique,” advantages the Apache and Modoc 
did not have. Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 151. 
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an increased desire to see genocide as a practice, regardless of the emphasis on particular 
strategies of violence, reduced in form and frequency.  
Additionally, in no way does this thesis have the goal of encouraging a step back 
from situations in which a group of people is calling for extermination, while another 
group of people is successfully combatting the strategy, such as these cases in the history 
of the Plains Indian Wars. As was seen, despite success in preventing frequent massacre 
or extermination, genocide was carried out nonetheless. The goal of this research was to 
encourage genocide theorists and prevention practitioners to take a careful look at areas 
of potential violence today, which may not be in danger of massacre or mass killings, but 
are in danger of violent discrimination against a certain group of people, above all if their 
justification is in line with “civilized ideals.” Perhaps Michael Mann’s hypothesis that 
modern genocide is born out of democratization gives a firm example to look out for. 
Despite the benefits that democratization may hold, we must be vigilant in preventing 
violence that may accompany it, as well as vigilant in combatting the violence 
accompanying any form of government, economic, religious, or social shift. 
One final thought on an idea which seems to pervade many discussions about 
mass violence. There is a common depression that seems to strike people who hear about, 
but choose not to engage with or study mass killings. It seems that many people believe 
that the ancient ubiquitousness of genocide provides an inability to truly address and 
combat it, and that there is no real hope for a more peaceful future.  
We must remember, however, that as a species we have a collective memory that 
is now spanning several thousand years. We remember the first people to codify law, to 
declare ethics, to push people to follow those ethics. We remember the moment that 
73 
 
nations began outlawing practices that have been almost eternal in function: slavery, rape, 
genocide. Alas, we seem to forget how extraordinary the act of outlawing these practices 
is. We have taken many steps to protect future generations from the horrors that mar our 
past, and stymy our progress in the present, but we must see those steps as hope that 
someday our species can move past the extreme violence which marks our history, and 
move forward to a future that emphasizes our cooperative, rather than isolative, 
tendencies. 
 
 “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.” 
          - Martin Luther King, Jr.196 
  
                                                     
196 Martin Luther King Jr. “1964 June 8, Hartford Courant, Wesleyan Baccalaureate.” Speech, Hartford, 
Connecticut, June 8, 1964. 
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